This document describes how to use the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) over Transport
Introduction
Provision of location information by reference [RFC5808] involves the creation of a resource that is identified by a "location URI". A "location URI" is a URI [RFC3986] that identifies a resource containing the location of an entity. A location URI might identify a temporary resource, created in response to a HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) [RFC5985] request. A location URI does not intrinsically include location information, instead the URI is "dereferenced" by a Location Recipient to acquire location information. This document specifies how a holder of a location URI uses that URI to retrieve location information.
HELD defines a use of HTTP that enables location configuration -the process where a Device acquires location information about itself. A part of location configuration is the provision of a location URI. However, HELD does not describe how such a URI is used; this document provides that definition.
This document defines how HELD is used by a Location Recipient to dereference a location URI and acquire location information. The result of this process is a location object in the form of a Presence Information Data Format -Location Object (PIDF-LO) document [RFC4119] . A constrained set of HELD features are defined such that it is suitable for use as a location dereference protocol [RFC5808] . Use as a location dereference protocol requires use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) binding for HTTP [RFC2818] in order to provide confidentiality, authentication and protection from modification.
Use of HELD as a dereferencing protocol has the advantage that the Location Recipient can indicate the type of location information it would like to receive. This functionality is already available with the HELD base specification, described in [RFC5985] . Furthermore, the HELD response from the LIS towards the Location Recipient not only provides the PIDF-LO but also encapsulates supplementary information, such as error messages, back to the Location Recipient.
Location URIs created for use with HELD dereferencing use the "https:" or "http:" scheme. The behaviour described in this document can be used by Location Recipients that are aware of the fact that the URI is a location URI.
An example scenario envisioned by this document is shown in Figure 1 . This diagram shows how a location dereference protocol fits with location configuration and conveyance. [ 
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 
Authorization Models
This section discusses two extreme types of authorization models for dereferencing with HELD URIs, namely "Authorization by Possession" and "Authorization by Access Control". In the subsequent subsections we discuss the properties of these two models. Figure 2 , from [RFC5808] , shows the model applicable to location configuration, conveyance and dereference.
Figure 2: Communication Model
It is important to note that this document does not mandate a specific authorization model. It is possible to combine aspects of both models. However, no authentication framework is provided, which limits the policy options available when the "Authorization by Access Control" model is used. For either authorization model, the overall process is similar. The following steps are followed, with minor alterations: 2. The Target then conveys the location URI to a third party, the Location Recipient (for example using SIP as described in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-location-conveyance]). This step is shown in (2) of Figure 2 .
3. The Location Recipient then needs to dereference the location URI in order to obtain the Location Object (3). Depending on the URI scheme of the location URI dereferencing might, as is the case for "https:" or "http:" URIs, be performed as described in this document.
In this final step, the Location Server (LS) or LIS makes an authorization decision. How this decision is reached depends on the authorization model.
Authorization by Possession
In this model, possession -or knowledge -of the location URI is used to control access to location information. A location URI is constructed such that it is hard to guess (see C9 of [RFC5808] ) and the set of entities that it is disclosed to is limited. The only authentication required by the LS is evidence of possession of the URI. The LS is able to immediately authorize any request that indicates this URI.
Authorization by possession uses a very simple policy that does not typically require direct interaction with a Rule Maker; it is assumed that the Rule Maker is able to exert control over the distribution of the location URI. Therefore, the LIS can operate with limited policy input from a Rule Maker.
Limited disclosure is an important aspect of this authorization model. The location URI is a secret; therefore, ensuring that adversaries are not able to acquire this information is paramount. Encryption, such as might be offered by TLS [RFC5246] or S/MIME [RFC5751] , protects the information from eavesdroppers.
Use of authorization by possession location URIs in a hop-by-hop
protocol such as SIP [RFC3261] adds the possibility of on-path adversaries. Depending on the usage of the location URI for certain location based applications (e.g., emergency services, location based routing) specific treatment is important, as discussed in
Using possession as a basis for authorization means that, once granted, authorization cannot be easily revoked. Cancellation of a location URI ensures that legitimate users are also affected; application of additional policy is theoretically possible, but could be technically infeasible. Therefore, other measures are provided to prevent an adversary from gaining access to location information indefinitely.
A very simple policy is established at the time that the location URI is created. This policy specifies that the location URI expires after a certain time, which limits any inadvertent exposure of location information to adversaries. The expiration time of the location URI might be negotiated at the time of its creation, or it might be unilaterally set by the LIS.
Authorization via Access Control
Use of explicit access control provides a Rule Maker greater control over the behaviour of an LS. In contrast to authorization by possession, possession of a this form of location URI does not imply authorization. Since an explicit policy is used to authorize access to location information, the location URI can be distributed to many potential Location Recipients.
Either before creation or dissemination of the location URI, the Rule Maker establishes an authorization policy with the LS. In reference to Figure 2 , authorization policies might be established at creation (Step 1), and need to be established before before the location URI is published (
Step 2) to ensure that the policy grants access to the desired Location Recipients. Depending on the mechanism used, it might also be possible to change authorization policies at any time.
A possible format for these authorization policies is available with GEOPRIV Common Policy [RFC4745] and Geolocation Policy [I-D.ietf-geopriv-policy]. Additional constraints might be established by other means.
The LS enforces the authorization policy when a Location Recipient dereferences the URI. Explicit authorization policies allow a Rule Maker to specify how location information is provided to Location Recipients.
Access Control with HELD Deference
This document does not describe a specific authentication mechanism. This means that authorization policies are unable to specifically identify authorized Location Recipients.
In order to control access to location information based on the identity of the Location Recipient, use of authorization by possession is employed. By controlling which Location Recipients receive location URIs, access to location information is controlled. Providing that knowledge of a location URI is limited, policy appropriate to the Location Recipients that receive the location URI can be assigned. Selective disclosure used in this fashion can be used in place of identity-based authorization.
How policy is associated with a location URI is not defined by this document.
[I-D.barnes-geopriv-policy-uri] describes one possible mechanism.
Authentication of Location Recipients and use of identity-based authorization policy is not precluded. A Location Server MAY support an authentication mechanism that enables identity-based authorization policies to be used. Future specifications might define means of identifying recipients.
Note: Policy frameworks like [RFC4745] degrade in a way that protects privacy if features are not supported. If a policy specifies a rule that is conditional on the identity of a recipient and the protocol does not (or cannot) provide an assertion identity of the recipient, the rule has no effect and the policy defaults to providing less information.
HELD Dereference Protocol
This section describes how HELD can be used to dereference a location URI. This process can be applied when a Location Recipient is in possession of a location URI with a "https:" or "http:" URI scheme.
A Location Recipient that wishes to dereference an "https:" or "http:" URI performs a HELD request on HTTP to the identified resource.
Note: In many cases, an "http:" URI does not provide sufficient security for location URIs. The absence of the security mechanisms provided by TLS means that the Rule Maker has no control over who receives location information and the Location Recipient has no assurance that the information is correct.
The Location Recipient establishes a connection to the LS, as described in [RFC2818] . MUST NOT be used. The LS MUST be authenticated to ensure that the correct server is contacted.
A Location Server MAY reject a request and request that a Location Recipient provide authentication credentials if authorization is dependent on the Location Recipient identity. Future specifications could define an authentication mechanism and a means by which Location Recipients are identified in authorization policies. This document provides definitions for neither item.
HELD Usage Profile
Use of HELD as a location dereference protocol is largely the same as its use as a location configuration protocol. Aside from the restrictions noted in this document, HELD semantics do not differ from those established in [RFC5985] .
The HELD "locationRequest" is the only request permitted by this specification. Similarly, request parameters other than the following MUST NOT be accepted by the LS: "responseTime", "locationType" (including the associated "exact" attribute).
Parameters and requests that do not have known behaviour for dereference requests MUST NOT be used. The LS MUST ignore any parameters that it does not understand unless it knows the parameters to be invalid. If parameters are understood by the LS and known to be invalid, the LS MAY generate a HELD error response. For instance, those defined in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions] are always invalid and can be rejected.
The LS MUST NOT generate location URIs or provide a "locationUriSet" in response to a dereference request. If the location request contains a "locationType" element that includes "locationURI", this parameter is either ignored or rejected as appropriate, based on the associated "exact" attribute.
HTTP GET Behavior
GET is the method assumed by generic HTTP user agents, therefore unless context identifies an "https:" URI as a HELD URI, such a user agent might simply send an HTTP GET. Rather than providing an HTTP 405 (Method Not Allowed) response indicating that POST is the only permitted method, this document describes a way for a LIS to provide a HELD location response if it receives an HTTP GET request.
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An HTTP GET request to a HELD URI produces a HELD response as if the following HELD request had been sent using HTTP POST:
<locationRequest xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held"> <locationType exact="false"> geodetic civic </locationType> </locationRequest>
Figure 3: GET Request Equivalent Location Request
HTTP GET requests must be safe and idempotent [RFC2616] -that is, there are no side-effects of making the request and a repeated request has no more effect than a single request. Only when a location URI is created does HELD request have side-effects. Repeating a HELD request might result in a different location, but only as a result of a change in the state of the resource: the location of the Target.
A request to a location URI can be both safe and idempotent, since a location URI cannot be produced in response to a request to a location URI.
Content negotiation MAY be supported to produce a presence document in place of a HELD location response. Where the presence document would otherwise be included in a "locationResponse" document, it can be included in the body of the HTTP response directly by including an "Accept" header that includes "application/pidf+xml".
Examples
The example in Figure 4 shows the simplest form of dereferencing request using HELD to the location URI "https://ls.example.com:49152/uri/w3g61nf5n66p0". The only way that this differs from the example in Section 10.1 of [RFC5985] is in the request URI and the source of the URI. The following GET request is treated in an equivalent fashion. The LS treats this request as though it were a location request of the form shown in Figure 3 . The same response might be provided.
GET /uri/w3g61nf5n66p0 HTTP/1.1 Host: ls.example.com:49152 Accept: application/held+xml Use of TLS for the dereferencing of location URIs is strongly RECOMMENDED, as discussed in Section 4. Location Recipients MUST authenticate the host identity using the domain name included in the location URI, using the procedure described in Section 3.1 of [RFC2818] . Local policy determines what a Location Recipient does if authentication fails or cannot be attempted.
The authorization by possession model (Section 3.1) further relies on TLS when transmitting the location URI to protect the secrecy of the URI. Possession of such a URI implies the same privacy considerations as possession of the PIDF-LO document that the URI references.
Location URIs MUST only be disclosed to authorized Location Recipients. The GEOPRIV architecture [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch] identifies the Rule Maker role as being the entity that authorizes disclosure of this nature.
Protection of the location URI is necessary, since the policy attached to such a location URI permits any who have the URI to view it. This aspect of security is covered in more detail in the specification of location conveyance protocols, such as [I-D.ietf-sipcore-location-conveyance].
The LS MUST NOT provide any information about the Target except its location, unless policy from a Rule Maker allows otherwise. In particular, the requirements in [RFC5808] mandate this measure to protect the identity of the Target. To this end, an unlinked pseudonym MUST be provided in the "entity" attribute of the PIDF-LO document.
Further security considerations and requirements relating to the use of location URIs are described in [RFC5808] .
IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA. C4. "Location Information Masking: The location URI MUST ensure, by default, through randomization and uniqueness, that the location URI does not contain location information specific components."
Compliant: The HELD specification explicitly references this requirement in providing guidance on the format of the location URI.
C5. "Target Identity Protection: The location URI MUST NOT contain information that identifies the Target (e.g., user or device)."
Compliant: The HELD specification provides specific guidance on the anonymity of the Target with regards to the generation of location URIs. Section 6 expands on this guidance.
C6. "Reuse indicator: There SHOULD be a way to allow a Target to control whether a location URI can be resolved once only, or multiple times."
Not Compliant: Specific extensions to the protocol or authorization policy formats is needed to alter the default behavior, which allows unlimited resolution of the location URI.
C7. "Selective disclosure: The location configuration protocol MUST provide a mechanism that allows the Rule Maker to control what information is being disclosed about the Target."
Compliant with Extension: Use of policy mechanisms and [I-D.barnes-geopriv-policy-uri] enable this capability. Note that this document recommends that only location information be provided.
C8. "Location URI Not guessable: As a default, the location configuration protocol MUST return location URIs that are random and unique throughout the indicated lifetime. A location URI with 128-bits of randomness is RECOMMENDED."
Compliant: HELD specifies that location URIs conform to this requirement.
C9. "Location URI Options: In the case of user-provided authorization policies, where anonymous or non-guessable location URIs are not warranted, the location configuration protocol MAY support a variety of optional location URI
